Authoritative English for CAIQ: Clear, Reusable Responses for the Encryption Section

Step 1: Decode the CAIQ Encryption Section (What the buyer is validating)

The CAIQ encryption section is designed to verify whether a provider applies cryptography in a systematic, policy-driven, and testable way across the customer data lifecycle. Buyers are not only checking for the presence of encryption; they are validating consistency, alignment with recognized standards, and traceable ownership. Understanding this intent helps you answer confidently without overpromising.

The section clusters around four assurance themes:

• Encryption at rest: Buyers want confirmation that data stored on disks, databases, object stores, and backups is encrypted using strong algorithms, with defined key management and access controls. They also expect clarity on whether metadata, logs, and derived data are covered.
• Encryption in transit: The focus is on TLS configuration, cipher strength, certificate management, and coverage for all traffic paths: client-to-service, service-to-service, admin interfaces, and subprocessor links. Buyers also look for downgrade protections and deprecation of weak protocols.
• Key management: This is the control family that distinguishes mature programs. It includes key generation, storage (HSM/KMS), rotation, revocation, access segregation, audit logging, and lifecycle events (backup, escrow, destruction). Clear separation of duties and monitoring are essential.
• Cryptographic standards: Buyers expect algorithm and protocol choices to be justified against recognized standards (NIST, FIPS 140-2/140-3 for modules, industry profiles such as TLS 1.2+ with modern cipher suites). They also look for a documented deprecation policy and a change management path for crypto evolution.

These CAIQ items map naturally to SOC 2 Common Criteria, particularly CC6 (logical access), CC7 (change management and monitoring), and CC8 (system operations), with additional relevance to confidentiality and processing integrity. If you maintain SOC 2, you should already have policies, procedures, and evidence logs that back your CAIQ responses. The key is to textually connect your practices to these expectations without creating new obligations that your audits cannot support.

Typical pitfalls include:

• Vague claims: Saying “we encrypt everything” without scoping storage types, environments, or exceptions. Buyers will view this as an overreach that is hard to validate.
• Incomplete scope: Focusing on production databases while ignoring backups, ephemeral storage, message queues, or application logs that may contain personal data.
• Missing evidence anchors: Claiming FIPS-validated modules or HSM use without naming the validation certificate, KMS configuration class, or audit artifacts (e.g., key rotation logs).
• Unclear ownership: Not specifying whether encryption responsibilities lie with the vendor, a subprocessor, or the customer (e.g., customer-managed keys, client-side encryption).
• Inconsistent terminology: Mixing “TLS,” “SSL,” “FIPS,” “NIST-approved,” and “HSM” loosely. This creates uncertainty and invites follow-up questions.

Success criteria for strong CAIQ encryption responses are straightforward:

• Verifiable: Each claim points to a policy, standard, or artifact that can be shown under NDA or in an audit.
• Bounded: The scope, environments, data classes, and interfaces are clearly defined; exceptions are disclosed and risk-managed.
• Reusable: Phrasing aligns with common RFP and questionnaire formats and can be lifted into SIG, VSAQ, or DDQ with minimal edits.
• Aligned: Statements match SOC 2 controls and other frameworks you maintain, reducing the risk of contradictions.

Step 2: Build an Authoritative Response Template

A modular template keeps your answers consistent across questionnaires and time, while giving you a clear place to attach evidence. Use the following structure to address each encryption topic:

• Policy Claim: A concise, directive statement that communicates the control intent and baseline requirement. It should map to a formal policy or standard in your ISMS and be written in authoritative language.
• Technical Controls: Concrete mechanisms and configurations in use (e.g., disk encryption methods, TLS minimums, cipher preferences, KMS/HSM settings). Specify defaults and any hardening profiles.
• Key Management: Details on key generation, storage, rotation, access control, and destruction. Reference roles, separation of duties, and logging.
• Standards/Evidence: The external standards that guide your choices (e.g., NIST SP 800-57, SP 800-52r2, FIPS 140-3) and the specific evidence you can provide (policy IDs, procedure names, tool outputs, certificates, audit logs).
• Scope & Shared Responsibility: The boundary of responsibility across vendor, subprocessor, and customer. Clarify covered environments (prod, staging), data types, and interfaces. Identify any customer-configurable aspects (e.g., BYOK, customer TLS settings).
• Monitoring & Review: How the controls are enforced and continuously validated (e.g., automated checks, SIEM alerts, certificate expiry monitoring, CMDB relationships, quarterly reviews).
• Exceptions & Roadmap: Known exceptions, compensating controls, and planned remediation timelines. Include deprecation policy for weak algorithms or protocol versions.

Effective phrasing patterns help ensure clarity and reusability:

• “We enforce [control] by default for [scope], with [mechanism] and [monitoring].”
• “Cryptographic modules are [validation status], and we track deprecation of [legacy elements] via [policy/process].”
• “Where customers assume control of [component], our responsibility includes [boundary], and the customer is responsible for [customer obligations].”
• “Evidence available under NDA includes [artifacts], generated by [systems/tools], retained for [duration].”
• “Exceptions are documented in [register], approved by [role], reviewed [cadence], and mitigated by [compensating control].”

Using this template for every encryption-related answer ensures your language is consistent and auditable, which reduces follow-up cycles in enterprise RFPs.

Step 3: Populate the Template with Model Answers

Below are model, editable statements aligned to the template. They illustrate authoritative phrasing, not marketing language. Each statement ties to policy, control detail, evidence, scope, monitoring, and exceptions.

• Encryption at rest

  • Policy Claim: We require encryption at rest for all customer data stored in production systems, including databases, object storage, block storage, file systems, and backups.
  • Technical Controls: Disk and storage services are encrypted using AES-256 or stronger. Managed database and object stores use provider-native encryption with keys in a centralized KMS. Ephemeral volumes and snapshots inherit encryption policies.
  • Key Management: Keys are generated by the KMS using HSM-backed root keys. Rotation occurs at least annually or upon key compromise. Access to keys is restricted to a dedicated service principal with least-privilege policies.
  • Standards/Evidence: Controls conform to NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 for key lifecycles. Evidence under NDA: encryption configuration exports, KMS key policies, rotation logs, and backup encryption settings.
  • Scope & Shared Responsibility: Applies to vendor-managed production environments and vendor-managed backups. Customer-managed exports outside the platform fall under customer control.
  • Monitoring & Review: Automated checks verify encryption flags on creation events; SIEM alerts on any non-encrypted resource. Quarterly audits validate policy adherence.
  • Exceptions & Roadmap: Any required exceptions must be pre-approved by Security Architecture and logged in the risk register with compensating controls. None active in production.

• Encryption in transit

  • Policy Claim: We mandate TLS for all external and internal data transit involving customer data.
  • Technical Controls: External interfaces enforce TLS 1.2+ with modern cipher suites; TLS 1.3 is preferred. Internal service-to-service traffic uses mTLS with short-lived certificates issued by our internal CA. Legacy protocols are disabled.
  • Key Management: Certificates are managed via automated issuance and renewal; private keys remain in secured stores with strict access segmentation.
  • Standards/Evidence: Aligned with NIST SP 800-52r2 and industry best practices. Evidence: TLS configuration manifests, cert inventories with expiry monitoring, and network policy rules.
  • Scope & Shared Responsibility: Applies to public APIs, admin portals, and internal microservice traffic. Customer connections must support TLS 1.2+; customers control their client configurations.
  • Monitoring & Review: Continuous scanning validates protocol and cipher posture; alerts trigger on weak suites or expiring certificates. Annual cryptographic review evaluates deprecations.
  • Exceptions & Roadmap: Where third-party endpoints cannot meet TLS 1.2+, a specific exception with compensating application-layer controls may be approved short-term, with a remediation plan.

• Key generation, storage, and rotation

  • Policy Claim: Cryptographic keys for protecting customer data must be generated, stored, rotated, and destroyed in a managed KMS with HSM-backed root of trust.
  • Technical Controls: Keys are created with approved key sizes; key material is non-exportable. CMKs are aliased for rotation; DEKs are envelope-encrypted. Strict IAM policies govern access.
  • Key Management: Rotation at least annually for CMKs, more frequently where supported. Immediate rotation on suspected compromise. Destruction follows a documented process with dual authorization and audit logging.
  • Standards/Evidence: Practices align with NIST SP 800-57 and SP 800-130 for key management frameworks. Evidence: KMS key policies, rotation schedules, destruction certificates, and access logs.
  • Scope & Shared Responsibility: Vendor manages keys for vendor-managed data. For BYOK, customers supply CMKs; we enforce DEK management and respect key revocation per shared responsibility documentation.
  • Monitoring & Review: SIEM monitors key usage anomalies; monthly reviews validate access patterns. Separation of duties ensures no single administrator can both approve and execute key changes.
  • Exceptions & Roadmap: No exceptions in production. Formal BYOK enhancements are tracked in the roadmap with documented timelines.

• Algorithm and protocol standards

  • Policy Claim: Only approved cryptographic algorithms and modules are permitted in production.
  • Technical Controls: AES-256-GCM for data at rest and session protection where applicable; TLS 1.2/1.3 with strong cipher suites; SHA-256 or stronger for hashing. Deprecated algorithms (e.g., RC4, MD5, SHA-1 for signatures) are blocked.
  • Key Management: Approved key sizes and curves are defined in the crypto standard; cryptographic modules are selected for FIPS 140-2/140-3 validation where available in the runtime environment.
  • Standards/Evidence: Aligned to NIST SP 800-131A and vendor-specific hardening guides. Evidence: crypto standards document, list of FIPS validation certificates or module IDs, and change control records for deprecations.
  • Scope & Shared Responsibility: Applies to vendor-managed components. Customer-developed plugins or integrations must follow the approved cipher policy when exchanging data with the platform.
  • Monitoring & Review: Annual review of approved ciphers and curves; active scanning for deprecated algorithms in dependencies and endpoints.
  • Exceptions & Roadmap: Exception requests require CISO approval with time-bound remediation. Planned retirement dates are communicated to customers in release notes.

• Subprocessor handling

  • Policy Claim: Subprocessors that handle customer data must enforce encryption in transit and at rest with controls equivalent to our standards.
  • Technical Controls: Contractual clauses mandate TLS 1.2+ for data exchange and storage encryption with KMS-backed keys. Data transfers use mTLS or IPsec where applicable.
  • Key Management: Subprocessors must manage keys in a KMS/HSM with rotation at least annually. Access to keys is limited to service identities and audited.
  • Standards/Evidence: Third-party assessments (SOC 2 Type II, ISO 27001) are reviewed annually. Evidence: latest audit reports, security addenda with crypto requirements, and vendor risk assessments.
  • Scope & Shared Responsibility: Applies to all subprocessors with logical or physical access to customer data. We maintain a public list of subprocessors and notify customers of changes.
  • Monitoring & Review: Vendor risk management performs annual reviews and tracks remediation items. Technical verification includes TLS scans of subprocessor endpoints.
  • Exceptions & Roadmap: New subprocessors must meet crypto baselines before onboarding; no exceptions for storage encryption.

Step 4: Adapt and Validate for Enterprise RFPs and Other Questionnaires

To make your responses portable across CAIQ, SIG, VSAQ, and DDQs, separate your content into two layers: a concise assertion for the questionnaire cell and a linked detail set for audits and follow-ups. CAIQ often favors short, direct answers with references, while SIG and detailed DDQs may request extensive descriptions. Maintain one canonical source and export different views.

• Tailoring for CAIQ brevity: Use single-sentence claims plus an evidence pointer. Example pattern: “Yes—AES-256 at rest with KMS-managed keys (rotation ≥ annually); evidence: Crypto Standard CS-01, KMS rotation logs Q2 FYxx.” Keep terminology consistent and avoid product-specific jargon where not required.

• Preserving depth for SIG/VSAQ/DDQ: Include the full template content in your master library. When exporting to longer formats, expand Technical Controls and Key Management sections and attach artifact names with retention periods.

• Validation checklist:

  • Does each claim have a corresponding policy or standard ID?
  • Are scope statements explicit about environments, data types, and interfaces?
  • Are deprecated protocols and algorithms explicitly disallowed?
  • Is ownership clear across vendor, subprocessor, and customer (including BYOK)?
  • Do monitoring and review mechanisms specify cadence and tooling?
  • Are exceptions documented with compensating controls and time-bound remediation?
  • Can you produce evidence within the timeframe typical for RFPs (5–10 business days)?

• Redline substitutions for different environments:

  • SaaS single-tenant vs. multi-tenant: Replace “per-tenant logical separation” with “dedicated tenant environment” for single-tenant; retain per-tenant keys and namespace isolation language for multi-tenant.
  • BYOK vs. vendor-managed keys: Swap “vendor-managed CMK in KMS” with “customer-provided CMK via KMS external key store; we manage DEKs and enforce envelope encryption.” Add revocation behavior and downtime expectations for BYOK.
  • On-prem/edge components: Replace “cloud-native KMS” with “FIPS 140-3 validated HSM appliance” and adjust monitoring references from cloud-native logs to SIEM/endpoint agents.
  • Regulated data variants: Insert “FIPS-validated modules” and, where required, “FedRAMP Moderate/High controls” or “PCI DSS cryptographic requirements” as applicable.

Finally, keep a living crypto standard and evidence catalog. When algorithms are deprecated or modules are upgraded, update the Policy Claim and Technical Controls once, then propagate changes to all questionnaire outputs. This practice keeps your CAIQ responses authoritative, auditable, and reusable across enterprise procurement cycles.